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ARTICLES

The History of the Independent
Counsel Provisions: How the Past
Informs the Current Debate
by Katy J. Harriger
I.

INTRODUCTION

The current "feeding frenzy"' around the campaign finance scandal
invites us to reflect upon the importance of the past. The independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act 2 are the product of
a particular time and sequence of events that determined their shape
and continue to influence their implementation. If we want to understand the current controversy surrounding Attorney General Janet

* Associate Professor of Politics, Wake Forest University. University of Connecticut
(Ph. D., 1986).
1. Larry Sabato uses this term to apply to a time when "acritical mass of journalists
leap to cover the same embarrassing or scandalous subject and pursue it intensely, often
excessively, and sometimes uncontrollably." LARRY SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY 6 (1991).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1978).
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Reno's interpretation of the independent counsel provisions, we must
look back at the legislative history of those provisions and the larger
history of the time.
When we look back, we can see that the issues at the center of the
debate about the provisions today were there from the start. The
difficult choices that faced the lawmakers then are no less difficult
today. In response to the Watergate scandal, Congress sought to write
a constitutional statute that balanced the competing values of independence and accountability in a political climate of deep partisan and
public distrust. Could Congress create an officer independent of the
executive branch without running afoul of the constitutional scheme of
separation of powers? Would an officer wielding prosecutorial power
independent of the executive branch be an unaccountable persecutor of
vulnerable public officials? Could Congress create an arrangement that
removed politics from the consideration of criminal allegations against
executive branch officers? Could an independent counsel arrangement
help restore public confidence in government in the wake of Watergate?
The question we must ask ourselves today is not whether Congress could
or should have come up with different answers then but whether twenty
years later, in a political environment even more steeped in distrust,'
we can imagine any other balance among these interests.
In this Article, I use the history of the independent counsel provisions
to frame the current controversies surrounding the arrangement. I
begin with a brief discussion of the uses of special prosecution arrangements prior to Watergate, followed by a fuller discussion of the influence
of the Watergate scandal on the creation of the 1978 provisions. After
an exploration of the various issues debated by Congress before passage
of the provisions, I consider the way in which the implementation of the
Act shaped the debates at each consecutive reauthorization in 1982,
1987, and 1994." Finally, I return to the present, linking this history
with the current controversies about the Attorney General's discretion,
the independent counsel's independence, and the alternatives to the
independent counsel in a climate of distrust.

II. THE AD-HOC USES OF SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
Special prosecutors were appointed in three major national political
scandals in the twentieth century prior to the adoption of the 1978
provisions. In the Teapot Dome scandal of the 1920s, the tax scandal of

3. SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL: THE CULTURE OF MISTRUST IN AMERICAN POLITICS
6 (1992).
4. See KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 13-91 (1992) (providing a more detailed explanation of this history).
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the 1950s, and the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s, presidentially
appointed special prosecutors investigated allegations of wrongdoing by
executive branch officials. It was the Watergate scandal that most
directly led to the creation of the Ethics Act provisions, but the
experience with the other two scandals offers additional insight into the
dilemmas posed by independent prosecution.

A.

Teapot Dome

The administration of Warren G. Harding, often characterized as one
of the most corrupt of the twentieth century, was plagued by charges of
cronyism and corruption. The most historically significant of these
charges were attached to the Teapot Dome scandal, which involved
allegations of bribery and corruption in the leasing of the federal
government's naval oil reserves to private businesses. The scandal grew
out of the concerns of powerful conservationists that the Secretary of
Interior, Albert Fall, was not adequately enforcing conservation policy.5
In April 1922 the Senate agreed to investigate the way in which Fall had
handled the leasing of the Teapot Dome reserves. Responsibility for the
investigation fell on the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Survey,
but hearings were postponed until after the 1922 congressional
elections.'
Secretary Fall resigned in early 1923, but it was not until Harding's
death in August of that year that the rumors of corruption turned into
charges of bribery. Several months later the Senate finally began its
investigation, and as more evidence was uncovered, the committee
members began to talk of the need for a special counsel to handle the
legal work involved in cancelling the illegal contracts.7 Coolidge was
warned by Republicans on the committee that a special counsel was
likely, and he decided to preempt that action by announcing his own
appointment of counsel, drawn from both parties, to pursue the
necessary litigation. He nominated former Democratic Senator Atlee
Pomerene of Ohio and future Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, then
a prominent attorney from Philadelphia, to be special counsel in the
case. The Senate ultimately confirmed the two in February 1924.'

5. See BURT NOGGLE, TEAPOT DOME: OIL AND POLITICS IN THE 1920's (1962) (providing

an in-depth discussion of the scandal).
6. I at 4249. S. Res. 282, 67th Cong. (1922); B. Res. 294, 67th Cong. (1922). The
first resolution authorized the committee to investigate the leases, and the second
authorized the subpoenaing of witnesses and documents and the ability to hire outside
counsel and cite noncooperating witnesses with contempt.

7. NOGGLE, supra note 5, at 91.
8. Id. at 91-115.
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Pomerene and Roberts worked for the next four years on the cases
arising from the scandal. The Senate Committee continued its hearings,
and a special committee was formed to investigate whether the Attorney
General, Harry Daugherty, had obstructed efforts to investigate the case.
Daugherty resigned under this cloud of suspicion. In 1931 Albert Fall
entered federal prison after having been found guilty of accepting a bribe
for the oil leases and after having had his various appeals rejected. 9
B.

The Tax Scandals
The tax scandals of 1951 and 1952 were similar to the Teapot Dome
scandal in that they began with a congressional investigation that led
to the appointment of a special prosecutor. Congressional hearings into
allegations of misconduct by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
Tax Division of the Justice Department uncovered widespread tax fixing
involving complicity between both agencies.10
Large numbers of
revenue officers were forced to resign, and in 1952 the former Commissioner of Internal Revenue and his assistant were convicted of tax fraud.
The assistant attorney general responsible for the Tax Division was fired
and later convicted of conspiring to fix a tax case. Despite these efforts
by the administration to respond to the scandal, Congress continued its
embarrassing investigation, and President Harry S. Truman decided to
appoint a special commission to investigate the allegations.
Truman chose Newbold Morris, a New York attorney with a reputation
for fighting corruption, to lead the investigation. Morris's first act was
to prepare a questionnaire that was designed to measure income and
expenses to test whether the attorneys filling it out were living beyond
their means. The special counsel decided to ask all government officials
(including the President and Attorney General) to complete the form, not
just the attorneys in the two agencies under suspicion. When Truman
suggested to Attorney General Howard McGrath that Morris was
reaching beyond his assignment, McGrath fired Morris. Truman

9. Id. at 117-27, 210-11. See also Leases Upon Naval Oil Reserves, Senate Committee
on Public Lands and Surveys, 68th Cong. (1923).
10. FinalReport of the Subcomm. on Admin. of the Revenue Laws of the House Ways
and Means Committee, 82d Cong. (1952); Investigation of the Dep't of Justice: Hearings
Before the Special Subcomm. to Investigate the JusticeDept of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
82d Cong. (1952).
11. See HAROLD F. GOSNELL, TRUMAN'S CRISES: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S.
TRUMAN 498-99 (1980); ROBERT H. FERRELL, HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE MODERN

AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 143-44 (1983).
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C. Watergate
The Watergate scandal stands out among American political scandals
because it forced Richard Nixon's resignation from the presidency. But
beyond that dramatic conclusion, it was significant because it resulted
in the criminal convictions of a former Attorney General, a number of
high-level White House aides, many lower level executive branch
officials, and some private individuals and corporations. The vast
majority of these convictions was obtained by a series of special
prosecutors appointed by the Attorney General to investigate the
charges." Above all, the scandal is important to understanding the
current independent counsel arrangement because it was the firing of
the first Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox, which prompted
the congressional efforts to create a mechanism for an independent,
judicially appointed prosecutor.
The Watergate scandal began with a break-in at the Democratic
National Committee headquarters in June 1972 and ended with the
resignation of President Nixon in August 1974. In between, a complex
story of intrigue and cover-up gradually emerged through the work of
enterprising journalists, 4 congressional investigators, 5 and special
prosecutors."6 The full story of the scandal has been told many
times," so the emphasis here will be on two major aspects of the
scandal that most help us understand the current controversy: the

12. GOSNELL, supra note 11, at 501; FERRELL, supra note 11, at 144; NEwBOLD MORRIS,
LET THE CHIPS FALL: MY BATTLES WITH CORRUPTION 14-15 (1955). A copy of the

questionnaire can be found in the back of Morris's book. Id. at 297-308.
13.

See WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT 155-66 (1975).

14. See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1990)
(recounting the Washington Post reporters' role in uncovering the cover-up).
15. See the following memoirs of people involved in the congressional investigations:
SAMUEL DASH, CHIEF COUNSEL: INSIDE THE ERvIN COMMITTEE-THE UNTOLD STORY OF

WATERGATE (1976); SAMUEL ERviN, THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY
(1980); FRED THOMPSON, AT THAT POINT IN TIME: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE WATERGATE
COMMITTEE (1975).
16. See, e.g., RICHARD BEN-VENISTE & GEORGE FRAMPTON, JR., STONEWALL: THE REAL

STORY OF THE WATERGATE PROSECUTION (1977); JAMES DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW: THE
BATTLES OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS Cox AND JAWORSKI (1977); LEON JAWORSKI, THE
RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE (1976).

17. The most comprehensive history of the scandal relies on documents and tapes
released long after the scandal. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE (1990).

For day-to-day details of the unfolding of the scandal, see EDWARD W. KNAPPMAN,
WATERGATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE (Facts on File 1973-74).
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questionable behavior of some Justice Department officials in the early
part of the investigation and the "Saturday Night Massacre."
The Watergate burglars were prosecuted for the break-in by the U.S.
Attorney's office for the District of Columbia. In January 1973 three of
the five pleaded guilty. The two others were tried, but during the trial
no evidence of the involvement of anyone higher up emerged. Outside
the courtroom, however, the Washington Post continued to uncover
evidence of a conspiracy, and in February the Senate agreed to establish
a select committee to investigate the allegations. At the sentencing of
the burglars in late March, one of the accused (James McCord) informed
Judge John Sirica that they had been pressured to plead guilty, that
some defendants had committed perjury during the trial, and that there
were others involved who had not been prosecuted. McCord sought and
received immunity from the Senate committee in exchange for his
participation in the hearings. The President's counsel, John Dean,
followed suit. Both testified before a grand jury that had been established by the Department of Justice to investigate the mounting
allegations of conspiracy. In April Attorney General Richard Kleindienst
was forced to resign along with H.R. Haldeman and John Erlichman, the
President's closest aides. As these events unfolded, the credibility of the
Department of Justice was called into question. Had the Department,
either intentionally or unwittingly, participated in the cover-up? Why
had the prosecutors pursuing the case against the burglars not been able
to discover the conspiracy? These questions forced to the forefront the
issue of whether the Department could be trusted to impartially
investigate the case.
Elliot Richardson was nominated to replace Kleindienst, and in
announcing the nomination, Nixon pointed out that Richardson had the
authority to seek a special prosecutor for this case if he deemed it
necessary"8 The Senate Judiciary Committee made clear that it
intended to link Richardson's confirmation with the appointment of a
special prosecutor.19 At the confirmation hearings, Richardson pledged
to make the appointment, and his choice, Harvard Law Professor
Archibald Cox, testified before the Committee as to his guarantees of
independence. Richardson was confirmed shortly thereafter."

18. President's Message Announcing Resignations and Appointments, Together with
Assignment of Responsibilities Regarding the Watergate Investigation, 9 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 431 (Apr. 30, 1973).
19. Chronology of Watergate Developments in 1973, 1973 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1014-43
(1974).
20. Nomination ofElliot L. Richardson to be Attorney General: HearingsBefore Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong. 4, 146-60 (1973) (Richardson's statement of intent to
accept Senate Judiciary Committee approval of special prosecutor; Cox testimony).
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The Watergate Special Prosecution Force, with Cox at the helm, was
set up through a Justice Department regulation that codified Richardson's promises of independence. 2' It was not long into the investigation
before it became embroiled in a dispute with Nixon's lawyers over access
to presidential tape recordings and official records sought by the Force.
Cox won the legal battle22 and refused to accept Nixon's proposed
"Stennis Compromise," which would have permitted Senator John
Stennis, an esteemed but aging Democrat, to review the tapes aided by
transcripts prepared by the White House. This confrontation led to the
famed Saturday Night Massacre. On October 20, Cox was fired, upon
Nixon's orders, by Acting Attorney General Robert Bork after Attorney
General Richardson and his deputy, William Ruckelshaus, had refused
to carry out the order and resigned.'
The overwhelming public outrage24 that followed these events
convinced Congress that it must act to insure an independent investigation in this case and set the stage for the discussion of a long-term
solution for future cases. Within days of the massacre, both houses of
Congress held hearings to consider the establishment of a special
prosecutor's office with legislative guarantees of independence. 2 A bill
creating a judicially appointed special prosecutor, introduced on October
23, 1973 in the House, had 150 sponsors. 26 The Senate focused its
attention on a bill, introduced by Birch Bayh and fifty-two other
senators, that also called for judicial appointment. Bayh urged Congress
to "set out as its first order of business, the difficult, but ... essential
goal of reestablishing the public faith and confidence from which all else

Richardson was confirmed by the Senate on May 23, 1973.

93 CONG. REC. 16,749-56

(1973).
21. Att'y Gen. Order No. 517-573, 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688 (1973).
22. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
23. Elliot Richardson, The Saturday Night Massacre, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1976, at 40. The Watergate Special Prosecution Force was dissolved by Acting Attorney
General Robert Bork. Att'y Gen. Order No. 546-73, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,466 (1973).
24. According to Western Union, the number of telegrams that arrived in Washington
after the "massacre" was the "heaviest volume on record." BEN-VENISTE & FRAMPTON,
supra note 16, at 150. By Monday, 150,000 telegrams arrived in the District. Ten
thousand went to the White House, the rest to the Watergate Special Prosecution Force
("WSPF") and Congress. Ten days later the number had risen to 450,000. Id.
25. Special Prosecutorand WatergateGrandJury Legislation: Hearingson H.R. 10937
Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong.
(1973); Special Prosecutor:HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong.
(1973). House hearings were held between October 29 and November 8, 1973. Senate
hearings began on October 29 and ran until November 20, 1973.
26. 93 CoNG. REc. 34,872 (1973).
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proceeds in a democracy." The massacre led to the wide-spread belief
that executive control of the special prosecutor quite clearly could, and
in this case quite dramatically did, interfere with the independence of an
investigation.
A week after Cox's firing, hoping to preempt congressional action, Bork
appointed a new special prosecutor.'m Congress was initially suspicious
of Leon Jaworski, a prominent attorney from Texas, and it continued its
hearings. Before ending its hearings on November 20, the Senate
Judiciary Committee asked Jaworski to testify before it. Jaworski
assured the Committee of his independence, pointing to new regulations
that required the consent of the majority of the Judiciary Committee
before he could be fired."
Congress seemed satisfied with these
assurances and stopped talking about creating a judicially appointed
office for this case.
There continued to be interest in Congress for creating an independent
prosecutor mechanism for future cases and for finding other ways to
insulate the Department of Justice from political influence. Thirty-five
different bills with 165 sponsors were introduced in Congress over the
next few months proposing various solutions to these problems."
Combined with the memory of the Saturday Night Massacre were
concerns about declining public confidence in government (and Congress

27.

93 CoNG. REc. 35,076 (1973) (statement of Senator Birch Bayh).

28. Remarks of Acting Attorney General Robert Bork Announcing His Appointment of
Leon Jaworski, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1303 (Nov. 1, 1973).

29. Special Prosecutor:HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong.
569 (1973) (statement of Leon Jaworski); Special Prosecutorand Watergate GrandJury
Selection: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the

Judiciary,93d Cong. 443 (1973). The WSPF was reestablished by Bork in Att'y Gen. Order
No. 551-73, 28 Fed. Reg. 30,738 (1973).
30. Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Separationof Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong.
234 (1974).
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in particular)3 and the very real potential for consequences at the polls
come election time. 2
D.

The Lessons of Ad-Hoc Appointments

As Congress considered legislation to respond to Watergate, it was met
with competing historical lessons from the previous ad-hoc appointments
surveyed here. All three investigations demonstrated that when a
scandal implicates the President or the Attorney, General, congressional
and public pressure can be brought to bear to insure that an independent investigation takes place. This lesson seemed to imply that there
was no need for a legislated response that removed the appointment of
a special prosecutor from the executive branch.
On the other hand, a competing and perhaps more powerful lesson
was also evident. In two of the three ad-hoc cases, both of which
involved the investigation of the sitting President's administration, the
special prosecutor had been fired.
Proponents of an independent
statutory mechanism could point to the demonstrated threat to
independence of having the executive control the prosecutor. Doubts
about the prosecutor's independence could undermine public confidence
in the investigation and defeat the purpose for having an independent
investigation. The memory of the Saturday Night Massacre had a
profound impact on Congress, and it was ultimately this lesson of the
negative consequences of executive control that drove the reform effort.

31. Public opinion polls showed a marked decline in public confidence in government
throughout the 1970s, but the steepest drop was during and immediately after the
Watergate scandal. GLADYS ENGEL LANG & KURT LANG, THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION:
THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESS, AND THE POLLS DURING WATERGATE 241-46 (1983). The Harris

survey found that between 1966 and 1976, the number of those having a great deal of
confidence in the executive branch and Congress dropped dramatically. Confidence in the
President dropped from forty-one percent to eleven percent. Probably more alarming to
Congress was that during that same time, confidence in Congress dropped from forty-two
percent to nine percent. There was a slight increase in confidence in both institutions after
the 1976 elections, but it remained quite low. More Confidence in Leadership, 5 CURRENT
OPINION 37 (1977).

32. The mid-term election of 1974 was devastating for congressional Republicans. The
Democrats gained forty-three seats in the House and three in the Senate, many in what
had been solidly Republican districts. 4 CONGRESS AND THE NATION 8-9 (1977). The 1976
election continued the trend, putting a Democrat in the White House and continuing the
"retaliation of the electorate against the Nixon loyalists" in Congress. GERALD M. POMPER,
ET AL., THE ELECTION OF 1976: REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 87 (1977).
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During the five years that Congress struggled with a legislative
response to Cox's firing, the debate centered primarily around a
constitutional dispute over the meaning of the separation of powers. At
the center of the constitutional issue was the tension between two
competing values at stake in criminal prosecutions of executive branch
officials: independence and accountability. The arrangement that
Congress adopted in 1978 and that is essentially unchanged today can
best be explained as a reasonable effort by Congress to balance these
competing values in a manner that could withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
A.

The ConstitutionalDispute

The central disagreement over special prosecutor legislation was
whether the power to appoint a special prosecutor could be removed from
the executive branch and placed in the judicial branch. Attached to that
concern were secondary issues about the term of office and the power of
removal. Where one fell in this debate tended to depend upon whether
one viewed the separation of powers doctrine as a flexible one that
allowed some blending of powers or a more formalistic one that drew the
line more sharply between departments.
Because of the events of Watergate, there was considerable distrust of
the executive and a concomitant trust of the judiciary. The role played
by Judge John Sirica in the Watergate trial was viewed quite favorably
by members of Congress.' In addition, judicial appointment seemed
the only constitutional alternative to executive appointment.
The arguments for judicial appointment were based in the largest
sense on the argument for independence. If special prosecutors were to
be truly independent of the executive, then they must not be subject to
appointment and removal by the executive. Proponents 8' of this
position based their argument on several provisions of the U.S.

33. This view was especially prevalent in the early hearings by the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees following the Saturday Night Massacre. Sirica's refusal to believe
the Watergate burglars were telling the whole story contributed to the unraveling of the
cover-up. See JOHN SuCA, To SET THE REcoRD STRAIGT (1979).
34. These arguments were made at the hearings and in several law review articles
published during consideration of the Act. See Karen H. Schneider, Richard Greenspan &
Amy Anzalone, The Special Prosecutorin the Federal System: A Proposal, 11 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 575, 577 (1973); Removing PoliticsFrom the Justice Department: Constitutional

Problems with InstitutionalReform, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 310, 366 (1975).
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Constitution as well as a body of supporting case law."5 They began by
citing Article I, Section 8, "the necessary and proper" clause. Given the
problem of conflict of interest when the executive branch is called upon
to investigate itself and the need for public confidence in an impartial
investigation in these cases, it was both necessary and proper to vest
appointment in someone outside the executive branch."6
Beyond this broad Article I claim, proponents relied on Article II,
Section 2, which gives Congress the power to vest appointment of "such
inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 7 While the appointments clause clearly seemed to exclude Congress from making the
appointment, the case law on congressional grants of appointment
authority to the judiciary appeared to support this alternative. In no
case in which Congress had vested appointment power in the courts had
that decision been found to be unconstitutional 8
Opponents of a judicially appointed prosecutor also found support in
Article II. Section 1 vests "executive power" in the President." While
the boundaries of that power are not clearly demarcated, it has generally
been presumed to include law enforcement because of the requirement
in Section 3 that the President "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."
Those who advocated executive appointment of a special
prosecutor insisted that Article II compels two conclusions: enforcement
of the law is an inherently executive function, and the executive branch
has sole constitutional authority for carrying out that function. 41 These
advocates could also call upon case law to support their position because
the courts had fairly consistently upheld executive authority over law

35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. Special Prosecutor: Hearingson S. 521-4.1 Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong. 72 (1973).

37. Id. at 73.
38. In re Henman, 38 U.S. 230 (1834); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); United
States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902

(D.D.C. 1967).
39. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
40. U.S. CoNST. art. II, §3.
41. Removing Politicsfrom the Administrationof Justice: HearingsBefore Subcomm.

on Separation ofPowers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong. 84 (1974). Law
review articles making this argument during this time include the following: Luis Kutner,
Nixon u. Cox: Due ProcessofExecutive Authority, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 441-60 (1974); Sen.
Howard H. Baker, Jr., The Proposed Judicially Appointed Independent Office of Public
Attorney: Some ConstitutionalObjectionsand an Alternative, 29 Sw. U. L. REv. 671 (1975);
Frank M. Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates Itself, 65 CAL. L. REv. 597-635 (1977).
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enforcement.4 2 Finally, opponents presented an Article III argument.
They claimed that judicial appointment of prosecutors created a
problematic blending ofjudicial and executive power that permitted the
unconstitutional supervision of the discretionary powers of prosecutors
by the judiciary.4
A secondary issue to the appointment dispute involved removal of the
special prosecutor. Positions here tended to depend upon the position
taken on the larger issue of appointment. The incident with Cox
demonstrated that independence could not be guaranteed without some
protection from summary dismissal, and there was case law to support
the notion that Congress could guarantee independence through
limitations on removal." But if the judges who appointed the counsel
could dismiss them as well, then even supporters ofjudicial appointment
feared that the arrangement might run into constitutional problems
because it would imply too much judicial control over prosecution. On
the other hand, supporters of executive appointment insisted that no
removal restrictions were appropriate because law enforcement was an
inherently executive function over which the President must have
complete control. Case law did suggest that the executive could remove
purely executive officers at will.45
As is so often the case in constitutional disputes, members of Congress
were faced with an interpretive dilemma. They had separate provisions
of the Constitution, each with its own supporting case law, that were in
conflict on this particular issue. The constitutional ambiguity had the
effect of slowing down the process of consideration and creating a climate
in which compromise seemed appropriate. It offered nonpartisan cover
to those who wanted to oppose the reform but feared doing so in the
political climate of the time. And finally, it invited the executive branch
to resist the proposed legislation as a matter of defending institutional
prerogative rather than as a matter of resisting reform.

42. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 244 (1922); Springer v. Government of the Phil.
Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965); Newman

v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But see Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(upholding judicial appointment of election supervisors despite the recognition that they
were carrying out executive duties).
43. SpecialProsecutor,supra note 36, at 37. Baker, supra note 41, at 679-81. See also
United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting, in part, that

prosecution and judgment "are separate functions" that "must not merge"). Marzano was
cited by Judge Gesell in Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973), the suit that
challenged Cox's firing. Judge Gesell noted the suggestions that the judiciary appoint
special prosecutors with distaste because he believed that courts "must remain neutral.
Their duties are not prosecutorial." Id.
44. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
45. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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B. Other Matters of Dispute
In addition to the constitutional concerns, Congress struggled with a
set of more pragmatic issues in its consideration of special prosecutor
legislation. Although not unrelated to the constitutional concerns, these
issues centered around the accountability implications of creating an
independent arrangement regardless of who did the appointing.
The central pragmatic dispute was over whether the office should be
a permanent or temporary one. A number of the proposals considered
in the wake of the Saturday Night Massacre called for the creation of a
permanent office with a fixed term and protection against summary
dismissal by the President. The basic assumption of these proposals was
that the problem of the executive branch investigating itself was an
enduring one. Having a permanent office would insure that we were
prepared for the next Watergate and would deter public officials from
misconduct in the future." Others preferred a temporary arrangement
in which appointment would be "triggered" when the need arose but no
ongoing bureaucratic enterprise would exist. They argued that a
permanent independent office created greater problems of accountability
and greater infringement on executive power while making it more
difficult to attract high-quality attorneys willing to give up their law
practices. In addition, critics of a permanent office challenged the notion
that Watergate was typical and questioned whether there was sufficient
work for a permanent office. Some feared that a permanent office might
feel the need to justify its existence by creating work when it was not
warranted.4 7 Instead, they argued that appointment should only be
triggered when the need arose and that at the end of the investigation,
the office should be shut down. The American Bar Association proposed
what it considered a workable triggering mechanism based on particular
legal findings of the possibility of criminal misconduct.'

46. Proposals ranged from terms of three years to fifteen years. Appointment schemes

varied between presidential and judicial appointment, but all contained removal
restrictions. These views were particularly prevalent during consideration of the
Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975, which proposed the establishment of
a permanent office of public attorney. WatergateReorganization and Reform Act of 1975,
Part I: Hearings on S. 495 Before Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th Cong. (1975)
[hereinafter WatergateReorganization]. See, e.g., id. at 4-5 (statements of Senator Lowell
Weiker); id. at 5 (statements of Senator Walter Mondale); id. at 86 (statements of Sam
Dash); id. at 297 (letter from political scientist James Sundquist).
47. Id. at 103-05 (statements of Leon Jaworski); id. at 120-21 (statements of Henry
Ruth); id. at 219 (letter from Peter Dingman).
48. AmmEucAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PREVENTiNG IMPROPER INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 18-20 (1976).
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There were other miscellaneous concerns expressed during the debate
that continue to resonate today. Gerald Ford's Attorney General Edward
Levi expressed concern about the damage to people's reputations that
could result from the public reporting requirements of the proposals and
the lack of confidentiality safeguards. He also warned that the creation
of a temporary office might lead to the proliferation of prosecutors in
multiple cases at the same time. 9 Congressman Henry Hyde warned
of the return to McCarthyism, suggesting that an independent permanent office with limits on removal might wield unaccountable and
awesome power to ruin people's lives.5 0 Philip Lacovara, a former
member of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, argued that "abuses
of public office will not be cured by giving unbridled power to an
ombudsman with a roving commission to do justice as he sees it."1
Finally, former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold and political science
professor Harold Seidman asked whether an independent office let the
President off the hook for faithful execution of the law. Griswold asked,
"Is it not better to put the responsibility squarely on the Executive
Branch, and then hold the Executive Branch responsible?"5 2 Seidman
wrote in a letter, "I want the President to be held responsible and
accountable for maintaining the honesty and integrity of the executive
branch, and I don't want this responsibility to be shared, even in a small
way, with the Office of Public Attorney." 8
IV. CONGRESS ACTS
By the end of hearings on the Watergate Reorganization and Reform
Act in 1976, a general consensus had emerged that the creation of a
permanent office was a bad idea." Instead, support for an independent
arrangement had coalesced around the American Bar Association's
proposal for a temporary judicial appointment triggered by the Attorney
General. In mark-up of the bill, the Senate Government Operations
Committee amended the bill to reflect this new consensus, and the
Senate prepared to debate it. But the Department of Justice, led by
Levi, mounted an intense lobbying campaign against the bill, insisting

49. Provision for Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 32-36 (1976) [hereinafter
Provisionfor Special Prosecutor].
50. Id. at 15-16.
51. Watergate Reorganization,supra note 46, at 261 (letter from Phillip A. Lacovara).
52. Id. at 234 (letter from Griswold).
53. Id. at 288 (letter from Seidman).
54. WatergateReorganizationand Reform Act of 1975, PartII: Hearingson S. 495 and
S. 2036 Before Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations,94th Cong. 162-63 (1976) (testimony of
ABA representative).
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that the judicial appointment violated the Constitution.55 There were
a number of influential senators who shared this concern, and the
Department was successful in convincing the Senate to amend the bill
yet again, this time providing for a permanent office within the
Department of Justice. The amended bill passed overwhelmingly in the
Senate in 197656 but languished in the House where a combination of
supporters of judicial appointment and opponents of any independent
mechanism at all were able to block the Senate proposal. 7
The election of a new President in 1976 cleared the way for passage
of a special prosecutor arrangement. On February 1, 1977, the Public
Officials Integrity Act, which included a temporary special prosecutor
mechanism, was introduced in the Senate. In May, when the hearings
on the bill began before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 8
President Jimmy Carter made it clear that he supported the legislation. 9 Most of the debate during these hearings focused on the
financial disclosure portion of the bill rather than on the special
prosecutor. Another key difference was the support of the Department
of Justice. While it disagreed with some of the details of the arrangement, the Department conceded that in special cases the temporary
The Senate moved
judicial appointment was not unconstitutional.'
quickly and passed the bill within two months of the hearings.6 1
Again, there was delay in the House, where members were embroiled
in their own scandal (Koreagate) and where there continued to be much
disagreement over whether any independent mechanism at all was
warranted. 2 The House Judiciary Committee report, issued a year
after the Senate had passed the reform bill, revealed continued division
over the constitutional issues and over whether the statute ought to

55. Mary Link, Senate Preparesto Debate Watergate Reform Measure, 34 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1903-04 (1976).
56. Mary Link, Senate Passes Watergate Reform Measure with Administration's
Changes, 34 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1953-54 (1976); 122 CONG. REC. 23,075 (1976).

57. See Provisionfor Special Prosecutor,supra note 49.
58.

See Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts, and Other Conflict of

Interest Matters: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong.
(1977) [hereinafter Public Integrity Act].

59. President's Message to Congress Urging Enactment of the Proposed Ethics in
Government Act of 1977 and Special Prosecutor Legislation, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
647-50 (May 3, 1977).
60. PublicIntegrityAct, supra note 58, at 9 (statement by John Harmon, Office of Legal
Counsel, Department of Justice).
61.

New Senate Watergate Bill Allows Special Prosecutor,Sets FinancialDisclosure, 35

CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1235-36 (1977). 123 CONG. REc. 21,007 (1977).
62. Ann Cooper, Watergate-InspiredBill May Force Vote on KoreaProbeIssue, 36 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 683 (1978).
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apply to Congress as well." It was September 1978 before the House
passed any post-Watergate reform, and its bill did not include provisions
for a special prosecutor. In the conference committee, the special
prosecutor provisions were added to the final bill, and the conference
report was adopted by both houses and signed into law by the President
in October 1978.64
The issues raised in the five-year debate about special prosecutors
would have important implications for the way in which the independent
arrangement was structured. The provisions that Congress adopted
reflected the tensions inherent in our constitutional system of separation
of powers. The final product attempted to strike a balance between the
traditional expectation that law enforcement was an executive function
and the congressional perception that public confidence depended upon
independence for a special prosecutor charged with investigating the
executive branch. In a more general sense, it was an effort to accommodate both the demands for constitutional accountability and institutional
independence. Too much weight on making the prosecutor accountable
to the executive would have raised serious doubts about independence,
something a majority of Congress was simply not prepared to accept in
the wake of the Saturday Night Massacre. On the other hand, too much
weight on the value of independence raised serious questions of
constitutionality and had the potential for creating an office with a
dangerous amount of power. The accommodation of these values
occurred through the division of responsibility for implementation
between the Attorney General and a panel of judges.
The Attorney General was given the authority to "trigger" the
appointment of a special prosecutor. Upon receiving specific allegations
of federal criminal law violations by a specified group of high-ranking
executive branch officials, the Attorney General was required to conduct
a preliminary investigation into the charges.' The Department had
ninety days to conduct the investigation but was not permitted to use
the compulsory process to obtain information.' During this time the
Attorney General had to decide whether the charges warranted further
investigation or prosecution. If not, they were required to file a report
with a special division of the Court of Appeals for the District of

63. Special ProsecutorAct of 1978: Hearingson H.R. 95-1307 Before House Comm. on
the Judiciary,95th Cong. (1978).
64. 124 CONG. REC. 34,526 (1978) (Senate vote on conference report); 124 CONG. REC.
36,469 (1978) (House vote on conference report); Remarks on the Signing of 5. 555 into
Law, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1854-56 (Oct. 26, 1978).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1978).

66. Id. § 592(aX1), (2).
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Columbia explaining why no further action was warranted.' If further
action was recommended, then the Attorney General was required to file
a report on these findings with the same judicial panel and request the
appointment of a special prosecutor.' Finally, the Attorney General
was given the power to remove the special prosecutor for "extraordinary
impropriety. 9 These provisions of the Act reflected Congress's
uncertainty about the constitutional question of whether law enforcement functions could be removed from executive control. By placing the
power to trigger the Act in the hands of the Attorney General, Congress
opted to recognize the accountability issues at the root of this dispute.
The actual appointment of a special prosecutor, however, was placed
in the hands of a special court panel established for the purposes of the
Act. The panel was to consist of three senior or retired federal circuit
court judges, appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.7" It had the responsibility of appointing special
prosecutors, defining their jurisdiction, receiving the reports of the
Attorney General and the special prosecutor, and deciding whether or
not to make those reports public.7 Although the power of removal was
vested in the Attorney General, the panel could review any decision of
removal if the special prosecutor requested it.72 The panel did not have
the power to review decisions by the Attorney General to request an
appointment.73 In creating the court panel and giving it the power of
appointment, Congress clearly sought to guarantee that the actual
conduct of an investigation and prosecution (if necessary) would be done
by an agent largely independent of the Attorney General. Here Congress
opted to weigh in on the side of independence.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND REAUTHORIZATION

In constructing the particular mechanism that it did, Congress sought
to compromise on the competing concerns raised in the debate. A review
of both the implementation of the provisions and the debates that arose
during each consecutive reauthorization reveals that the problems
identified in the first debate continued to plague congressional decision
makers. During each reauthorization debate, the experience under the
Act in the previous five years served as evidence of whether the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. § 592(b)(1), (2).
Id. § 592(cXl).
Id. § 596(a).
Id. § 49.
Id. §§ 593(b), 593(c), 595(bX3).
Id. § 596(a).
Id § 592(f).
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provisions were meeting the dual goals of independence and accountability. In addition, the concerns about fairness of the arrangement to its
targets and about the politicization of the process were given renewed
attention as implementation made them no longer hypothetical. Finally,
until the Court addressed the issue in 1988, 74 the constitutional debate
about the provisions continued to shape the reauthorization efforts.
A.

1978 to 1982
During the first five years of the life of the provisions, several events
led to a reconsideration of decisions made in 1978. Three special
prosecutors were appointed, two to investigate allegations of cocaine use
by White House staff members during the Carter Administration and
one to investigate alleged connections to organized crime by President
Ronald Reagan's Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan." In what
seemed an inevitable occurrence given the constitutional debate
surrounding passage of the Act, a civil suit was filed by one of the
targets of a special prosecutor provision challenging the constitutionality
of the Act. Finally, a new Republican administration was elected in
1980, one that was hostile to the Act and prepared to advance a broad
reading of executive powers throughout its dealings with Congress.
Republicans had also gained control of the Senate, making it more likely
that the President's concerns would receive a sympathetic hearing in
that body.
The first two investigations under the Act, of Hamilton Jordan and
Timothy Kraft for allegedly using cocaine in social settings, gave
credence to the administration's claim that the Act had a "hair trigger"
and was thus unfair to the officials covered under the Act. In each of
these cases, the targets were cleared after six-month grand jury
investigations. Critics noted the unwarranted expense of investigations
of this magnitude into allegations that would have been ignored by U.S.
Attorneys had they been made against ordinary citizens. The Department
of Justice insisted that it needed more discretion in triggering the
76
Act.

74. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
75. Arthur Christy, Report of the Special Prosecutoron Alleged Possessionof Cocaine
by Hamilton Jordan in Violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), Washington, D.C., Jan. 15, 1982;
Gerald Gallinghouse, In Re Investigation of Allegations Concerning Timothy E. Kraft:
Report ofSpecial Prosecutorin Compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 595(b), Washington, D.C., Jan.
15, 1982; Leon Silverman, Report of the Special Prosecutor,Washington, D.C., June 25,
1982.
76. See Special ProsecutorProvisionsof the Ethicsin GovernmentAct of 1978: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Management of the Senate Comm. on
GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong. (1981) [hereinafter Special ProsecutorProvisions];Ethics
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During the reauthorization process, Congress also considered the fact
that Timothy Kraft had filed a civil suit challenging the constitutionality
of the provisions under which he was being investigated. Kraft's lawyers
sought to enjoin the special prosecutor from investigating him, arguing
that Gerald Gallinghouse, the special prosecutor, was "exercising
Executive power and authority in violation of the Constitution of the
United States."77
Specifically, the suit challenged the role of the
judiciary in supervising a law enforcement official, the presumption that
the special prosecutor was an "inferior officer" under the appointments
clause, the designation of a panel of judges assembled for appointment
purposes as a "Court of Law," and the restrictions on the Attorney
General's removal powers.78
Kraft v. Gallinghouse was never decided because the special prosecutor
cleared Kraft of the charges before a decision could be reached. 79
Consequently, the constitutional debate continued to be a part of the
reauthorization debate, and the new administration took up the banner
of the side questioning the constitutionality of the provisions. The new
Attorney General, William French Smith, raised the issue in a letter to
the Senate Legal Counsel in 1981, writing, "In some or all of its
applications, the Act appears fundamentally to contradict the principle
of separation of powers erected by the Constitution ....
If the
Department's position is sought in future litigation, we would espouse
views 80consistent with the above and addressed to the specific facts of the
case."
The Amendments of 19838' reflected these executive concerns
although they failed to go as far as the Reagan Administration had
hoped. The Attorney General's discretion to trigger the act was
increased, but the appointment by the panel of judges was maintained.
The standard for triggering was lowered to allow the Attorney General

in Government Act Amendments of 1982: Hearingson S. 2059 Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of Gov't Management of the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong.
(1982); Amendment of the Special ProsecutorProvisionsof Title 28: Hearingsto Consider
S. 2059 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong. (1982).
77. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a
Preliminary IWunction at 2, Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952 (filed D.D.C. Nov. 19,
1980).
78. Id. at 8-14.
79. Joint Motion to Dismiss and Order of Dismissal, Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952
(filed D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1981),
80. Special Prosecutor Provisions, supra note 76, at 249-50 (letter to Senate Legal
Counsel Michael Davidson from Attorney General William French Smith, Apr. 17, 1981).
81. The bill was signed into law by President Reagan on Jan. 3, 1983.
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to consider both the specificity of the allegations and the credibility of
the accuser.82 The standard for removal was lowered to "good
cause."8 And finally, the special prosecutors were required to follow
Department of Justice guidelines in making determinations about
whether to pursue cases, "except where not possible.'
In order to
address the concerns about the effect of these investigations on the
targets, Congress added a provision permitting the court panel to
reimburse attorney fees for targets who were not indicted. It also
changed the name of the special prosecutor to the "independent counsel"
in order to try to reduce the stigma attached to the special prosecutor
title.88
Despite these concessions to the critics, Congress was not prepared to
abandon the independent counsel arrangement nor alter it fundamentally to allow the Attorney General complete control. The symbolic value
of independence from the executive was still perceived as being
important and the fact that a hostile President nonetheless signed the
reauthorization bill suggests that even the executive branch recognized
the political danger of challenging that independence.
B.

1983 to 1987
During the next five-year period, ensuing events shaped the debate for
the next round of reauthorization. More independent counsel were
appointed, more legal challenges were made, several key lower court
decisions interpreting the Act had an impact on implementation, and key
changes in leadership in both Congress and the executive branch created
new opportunities for confrontation. The effect of these events was to
swing the pendulum back towards limiting Attorney General discretion.
Independent counsel were publicly appointed between 1982 and 1987
to investigate a number of covered officials in the Reagan Administration. Cases involving Edwin Meese, Lynn Nofziger, Michael Deaver, and
the Iran-Contra scandal were higher profile and more controversial than
the earlier cases had been. In addition, in a case that received much
less attention, an independent counsel was appointed to investigate
whether Justice Department official Theodore Olson had lied to Congress
during a House committee investigation into the Environmental
Protection Agency in the early 1980s. This case gained public attention
only after Olson's constitutional challenge became the vehicle by which

82. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1)(A), (B) (1983).

83. Id. § 596(aX1).

84. Id. § 594(f.
85. Id. § 593(f).
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the United States Supreme Court would consider the constitutionality
of the Act.
Prior to the 1987 reauthorization hearings, Michael Deaver, Oliver
North, and Theodore Olson all mounted legal challenges to the
constitutionality of the independent counsel arrangement." In addition
to the constitutional challenges, the federal courts were also asked to
interpret the provisions dealing with the Attorney General's role in
triggering the appointment. During the service of William French
Smith, there were three efforts by individuals to force Smith to trigger
the appointment of an independent counsel when he had made a
determination that no further investigation or prosecution was
warranted. Each effort ultimately failed because appellate courts
concluded that the Attorney General's decision of whether to seek
was a discretionary one that was not reviewable by the
appointment
87
courts.

In addition to the legal challenges, the 1987 reauthorization was also
influenced by the appointment of Edwin Meese to be Attorney General
during Reagan's second term, the Senate's return to Democratic control,
and the Iran-Contra scandal that broke into the headlines in late 1986.
The fact that the Attorney General had twice been the target of
independent counsel investigationse and had publicly challenged the
constitutionality of the arrangement served only to convince many in
Congress of the need for an independent arrangement. With Meese as
Attorney General and Carl Levin of Michigan as the new chair of the
Senate oversight subcommittee with jurisdiction over the provisions, it
was not surprising that the 1987 changes to the statute did not favor the
executive position. Furthermore, by this time Reagan's popularity had
been seriously diminished by the "political body blow" of the Iran-Contra
scandal.89
In preparation for the 1987 hearings, the Senate subcommittee staff
investigated how the statute had been implemented since 1983. What
they discovered was a disturbing pattern of interpretive devices being
employed by the Department that the staff believed were not within the

86. Deaver v. Seymour, 656 F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1987); North v. Walsh, 656 F. Supp.
414 (D.D.C. 1987); In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987).
87. Banzhafv. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817
(9th Cir. 1986); Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

88. Jacob Stein, Report of the Independent Counsel ConcerningEdwin Meese II, Sept.
20, 1984 (clearing Meese of violations of ethics laws); James McKay, Report ofIndependent
Counsel In Re Edwin Meese III, July 5, 1988 (clearing Meese of tax law violations and
involvement with Wedtech scandal).
89. Ronald D. Elving & Janet Hook, The Reagan PresidencyFadesinto Its Twilight, 45
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2499-2503 (1987).
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statutory authority of the Attorney General. The committee report
concluded that "contrary to the statutory standard, in 50% of the cases
handled by the Justice Department since 1982 in which it declined to
conduct a preliminary investigation of a covered official, it relied on
factors other than credibility and specificity to evaluate the case.'
The report also cited problems in the interpretation of the recusal
requirements, the "good cause" standard of removal, and the status of
the independent counsel and their staff vis-a-vis the Department." In
opening the hearings, Senator Levin accused the Department of an
"indirect assault" on the statute by "trying to undermine the process
through the back door after being so unsuccessful using the front
door.'
In contrast to the 1982 reauthorization, the 1987 amendments focused
on limiting the Attorney General's conflict of interest. The oversight
investigation seemed to suggest that the 1982 enhancements of the
Attorney General's discretion, combined with the appellate court rulings
upholding that discretion, had put too great a weight on executive
powers at the expense of the value of independent investigation. As a
result Congress adopted several "clarifying" amendments designed "to
deal with Ed Meese.' s These amendments included limiting the
criteria used in deciding whether to begin a preliminary investigation to
"only" specificity of allegations and credibility of source;" limiting
threshold inquiries to fifteen days and requiring the Attorney General
to inform the court panel when a preliminary investigation has begun;"'
requiring the Attorney General to provide a prior, written recusal
decision when he becomes personally involved in a case covered by the
provisions, whether he recuses himself or not;9 and limiting the
Attorney General's ability to use "state of mind" criteria to dispose of
cases to only those cases in which a preliminary investigation has
provided "clear and convincing" evidence to that effect (in which case a
written report to the special panel was required).97

90. S. REP. No. 100-123, at 7 (1987) (Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of
1987).
91. Id. at 11-13.
92. Oversight of the Independent Counsel Statute: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Gov't Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th
Cong. 2 (1987) [hereinafter Oversight].
93. House Votes, 45 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2604 (1987) (statement of Congressman
Barney Frank).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 591(dXl) (1987).

95. Id. §§ 591(d)(2), 592(a)(1).
96. Id. § 591(e).

97. I& § 592(a)(2XB).
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The threat of a constitutional challenge hung over the 1987 reauthorization efforts. The D.C. Circuit decisions on the Attorney General's
discretion in triggering the Act and several recent Supreme Court
decisions about separation of powers issues seemed to favor the
executive power argument. 9 Supporters of the arrangement believed
that the key to the constitutionality of the statute was the temporary
nature of the office, the limited jurisdiction of the independent counsel,
and the role of the Attorney General in the process. Thus, proposals to
counteract the Attorney General's discretion through the strengthening
of the court panel's power to expand the independent counsel's jurisdiction over the Attorney General's opposition were rejected. Instead, the
Act was amended to encourage the Attorney General to give "great
weight" to a request for expansion of jurisdiction by the independent
counsel, but the decision to refuse a request was not reviewable by the
court panel."
Finally, it is worth noting that almost fifteen years after the firing of
Cox, that event still resonated with members of Congress, and the
concern of public confidence was strong enough to get presidential
approval for a bill that his administration claimed was unconstitutional.
In responding to the Department of Justice proposal for presidential
appointment of the independent counsel, Senator Levin called upon the
memory of Watergate, accusing the Department of Justice of wanting to
return to "where we were in 1973 when we saw headlines about 'Nixon
forces firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus quit'... what you want to
do is say let's just forget what has happened in the 1970's with that
Saturday Night Massacre." 0 0 President Reagan signed the amendments into law "over the advice of top aides and despite strong personal
reservations" because of the perceived impact on public confidence if he
were to veto it.'0 ' In his signing message, he said he was approving
the legislation because it was necessary to insure public confidence even
though he believed that the new restrictions on the Attorney General
only served to "aggravate the infirmities" of the arrangement. 2

98. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative veto unconstitutional); Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Gramm-Rudman Deficit Control Act unconstitutional).

99. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c) (1987).
100. Oversight, supra note 92, at 25.
101. Mark Willen, Balky Reagan Signs Extension of Independent Counsel Law, 45
CONG.

Q. WKLY. REP. 3166 (1987).

102. President's Statement on Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, 23
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1526 (Dec. 15, 1987).
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C.

1987 to 1994
The period between the second and third reauthorization was filled
with significant events that had a mixed effect on the independent
counsel arrangement. The Supreme Court finally spoke on the issue and
upheld the statute in Morrison v. Olson;' the Iran-Contra scandal
heated up and the independent counsel investigation of it became
controversial itself; the statute was allowed to expire atthe end of 1992
and was not reauthorized until 1994; and the new Democratic President,
Bill Clinton, helped persuade Republicans in Congress that the much
maligned Independent Counsel Statute might actually have some value
to the party out of power.
In upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel
provisions, the Supreme Court relied upon essentially the same
arguments that proponents of the arrangement made in the 1970s. The
Court found that the appointments clause of Article II permitted the
judicial appointment of this "inferior officer" because the duties,
jurisdiction, and tenure of the counsel were limited by the statute and
the Attorney General had the power of removal.'
Given Congress's
legitimate desire to insure independent investigation, the Court
considered judicial appointment of a temporary prosecutor a logical and
constitutional way to meet that end.10 5 Further, the Court rejected the
claims that the arrangement was in conflict with Article III powers
because the court panel's authority was limited largely to powers
incident to the appointment power."° Finally, the Court addressed the
argument that the provisions violated Article II by infringing on the
power of the executive to control law enforcement. Noting again the
limited nature of the independent counsel's appointment and the amount
of influence the Attorney General has in triggering the law, the Court
found that the limits of the President's ability to control the independent
counsel did not impede his ability to faithfully execute the laws. 107
Morrison was important for two reasons. First, for all intents and
purposes, it answered the constitutional questions that had plagued the
arrangement through the first fifteen years of its life. Certainly, some
critics believed the Court was wrong,"~ but with seven Justices behind

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Id. at 695-96.
Id. at 670-77.
Id. at 677-84.
Id. at 685-96.

108. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV.
L. REv. 105 (1988).
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the arrangement, it was politically difficult to use the constitutional
argument against the office. On the other hand, the Court's emphasis
on the limited nature of the independent counsel's appointment and the
significance of the role of the Attorney General in the process meant that
those who might like to extend the powers of the court panel or the
independence of the counsel also had a difficult case to make. If the
Independent Counsel Statute were to die, it would have to be at the
hands of Congress and for reasons other than its unconstitutionality.
The Iran-Contra scandal and the independent counsel investigation
led by Lawrence Walsh 1"' offered the new avenue through which critics
challenged the Act. Led by the efforts of Senate Majority Leader Bob
Dole, in late 1992 Congress allowed the independent counsel provisions
to expire without reauthorization. The focus of the criticism of the Act
became the alleged abuses of power by Walsh, the long period of time he
had taken to conduct the investigation, and the amount of money he had
spent during the investigation. While the investigation produced
fourteen indictments, seven guilty pleas, and four convictions, two of
those convictions had been overturned on appeal (Oliver North and John
Poindexter), and the cost of the seven-year investigation was almost
forty-eight million dollars. 0
In 1993 as the new Democratic President became embroiled in the
Whitewater scandal, many Republicans in Congress appeared to have a
change of heart. Now there was an Attorney General of the other party,
and they were unwilling to believe that she was able to conduct an
investigation without a conflict of interest. Efforts to reauthorize the
Independent Counsel Statute began anew, this time with the support of
the President, the Attorney General, and the majority of Congress."'
Finally, in June 1994 the independent counsel provisions were
renewed." 2 The amendments to the Act once again reflected the latest
controversies that had arisen since the last reauthorization. This time
the focus was on imposing more accountability on the independent
counsel. Most significantly, the new provisions added rules on control-

109.

LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FREWALL: THE IRAN-CNTRA CONsPIRAcY AND CoVER-UP

(1997).
110. Investigations by Independent Counsels: Should Congress Make Major Changes
in the Law? 7 CQ RESEARCHER 156 (1977) [hereinafter Independent Counsels].

111. Holly Idelson, WhitewaterBoosts Prospects Of Independent CounselBill, 52 CONG.
73 (1994).
112. 140 CONG. Rc. H3697-3703 (daily ed. May 19, 1994) (conference report). The

Q. WKLY. REP.

Senate adopted the conference report on May 17, 1994, and the House cleared it on June

21, 1994. Holly Idelson, Provisionsof Independent Counsel Bill, 52 CONG.
1739-40 (1994).

Q. WKLY.

REP.
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ling the costs of investigations,113 audits of independent counsel
expense records, 4 a requirement for annual reports to Congress from
the independent counsel,1 ' requirements for complying with Department of Justice procedures involving the handling of classified documents, 116 and a requirement that the appointing court panel review
the investigation7 periodically to determine whether it should continue or
be terminated.1

VI.

THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY

Since the reauthorization of 1994, the pendulum of independent
counsel reform has swung from a continued critique of the excesses of
independent counsel (this time focused on the investigations of Clinton
Administration officials) to a severe critique of the Attorney General's
discretion under the Act prompted by her refusal to request appointment
of an independent counsel for the campaign fundraising scandal. Until
the fundraising scandal broke, the focus of attention was on the need to
rein in independent counsel and to expand the discretion of the Attorney
General to trigger the Act."' No less a supporter of the independent
counsel than Archibald Cox acknowledged that the arrangement was
"overused and perhaps sometimes abused.""' He argued that the
potential for abuse could be reduced by limiting the coverage of the Act,
raising the standard for triggering the Act to give the Attorney General
more discretion, limiting the time period for an independent investigation, and requiring the independent counsel to work full time on the
case. 20 Only a year later, the climate for reform seems quite different.
Now attention is focused on the Attorney General's discretion as she is
forced to defend her interpretation of her responsibilities of the Act
before congressional overseers calling for her impeachment.
Can the history of the independent counsel provisions help us find
solutions to the dilemmas raised by the current debate? It does not
provide any easy answers. The original dilemma faced by Congress in
the wake of Watergate endures despite the efforts of reformers to resolve
it. Can independent prosecution coexist with executive branch
accountability mechanisms? At best, we can only say that the coexis113.

28 U.S.C. § 594(a), (b), (c) (1994).

114. Id. § 596(c).
115. Id. § 595(a)(2).
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117. Id. § 596(bX2).
118. Lisa Clagett Weintraub, Bill Would Rein in Special Counsels, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 2674 (1996).
119. Archibald Cox, CurbingSpecial Counsels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at A37.
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tence is an uneasy one, fraught with the kinds of problems that have
been revealed through implementation. Attempts to respond to
Increasing
particular problems seem only to aggravate others.
independence raises questions of accountability. Restricting counsel
interferes with their independence. Giving the Attorney General more
discretion seems only to enhance the potential for conflict of interest.
Restricting that discretion leads to unfair and unnecessary appointments. Some delicate balance must be struck and then found to be
acceptable as the least flawed of the available alternatives.
At worst, the answer must be no. A less optimistic interpretation of
the implementation experience suggests that the 1978 compromise has
met none of its intended goals. The Attorney General's potential conflict
of interest has not been removed because she must trigger the Act. The
independence of the prosecutor cannot be guaranteed without risking the
creation of an unaccountable and dangerous law enforcement agent.
Public confidence has not been restored and, some have argued, has in
fact been harmed by the proliferation of independent counsel appointments. 1 ' Before 1978 there were three scandals deemed worthy of
independent investigation. Since the passage of the Act, there have been
nineteen with the campaign finance issue left to be resolved. 2' And
quite clearly, "politics" has not been removed from the process of
investigating and prosecuting executive branch officials. As control of
the White House and Congress has changed, so too has the attraction of
the independent counsel arrangement. What was once an unconstitutional invasion of executive power to many Republicans is now the
arrangement that can save the Republic from efforts by Asians to buy
the White House. What was once a necessary mechanism to insure
public confidence and avoid conflict of interest to most Democrats is now
a punitive, intrusive, unaccountable arrangement for partisan warfare.
There seem to be two possible alternatives to the current mechanism,
and rather than defend one over the other, I want to point out why in
the post-Watergate climate of distrust, neither seems as acceptable as
the current arrangement, however flawed. First, Congress could
severely restrict the Attorney General's discretion in triggering the Act
and instead require that it be triggered anytime allegations of criminal
misconduct are received against particular officials. This would
eliminate the controversy surrounding how Attorneys General interpret
the Act that we saw during Ed Meese's tenure and that has reappeared
with the campaign finance controversy. The problems of this approach,

121. GARMENT, supra note 3.
122. Independent Counsels,supra note 110, at 156-57 (number climbed to nineteen with
the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate Bruce Babbit).
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however, are made clear in the history of implementation. Do we really
want a "hair trigger" in the statute? Is it fair to the targets of investigation? Is it a cost-efficient way to handle public misconduct cases?
Twenty years without an automatic trigger has produced seventeen
investigations costing us $114.5 million thus far.'
An automatic
trigger at a time of fierce partisan struggle could only multiply the
investigations and the expense. Finally, the larger and more important
expense is the "cost" to the psyche of the nation of proliferating
independent counsel investigations.
Alternatively, we might conclude that the costs of meeting the
independence goal are so great that we ought to return control of the
investigation of these cases to the Department of Justice. This might
involve a statutory requirement that the Attorney General appoint
outside counsel in certain cases or simply leave it to her discretion as it
was before 1978. In the current climate, the problem with this approach
seems self-evident. Will a Congress controlled by a different party
accept that appointment or the decision not to appoint? It seems highly
unlikely. The one example we have of this approach occurred during the
time when the Independent Counsel Statute had expired in 1992 but
had not yet been reauthorized. Janet Reno, using her discretionary
authority to appoint outside counsel, appointed Robert Fiske to
investigate the Whitewater case. He was held in high suspicion by the
Republicans in Congress, and his conclusion about the suicide of Vincent
Foster was simply not accepted by congressional partisans. As soon as
the statute was reauthorized, members of Congress urged the appointment of a new counsel, and Fiske was replaced by Kenneth Starr."
The experience with Fiske suggests that returning appointment
authority to the Attorney General is only a legislative likelihood when
one party controls both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue and that party has
sufficient strength in Congress to override the inevitable objections of
the minority party to that arrangement.
In the end, the history of the independent counsel suggests that there
are no simple solutions to the problems of executive branch investigation
of itself. Our constitutional scheme of separation of powers, the postWatergate climate of distrust, and the sustained period of divided
government all explain why Congress adopted the arrangement that it
did and why, despite its obvious flaws, we have been able to come up
with no better alternative. Certainly, the current arrangement could be

123. Id. at 159.
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improved, but the history warns us that those changes may well be the
cause of the next round of controversy about the statute. It was noble
but naive to believe that politics could be removed from the consideration of these cases.

